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Abstract China has embarked on an ambitious pathway for establishing a national carbon
market in the next 5–10 years. In this study, we analyze the distributional aspects of a Chinese
emissions-trading scheme from ethical, economic, and stated-preference perspectives. We
focus on the role of emissions permit allocation and first show how specific equity principles
can be incorporated into the design of potential allocation schemes. We then assess the
economic and distributional impacts of those allocation schemes using a computable general
equilibrium model with regional detail for the Chinese economy. Finally, we conduct a survey
among Chinese climate-policy experts on the basis of the simulated model impacts. The survey
participants indicate a relative preference for allocation schemes that put less emissions-
reduction burden on the western provinces, a medium burden on the central provinces, and
a high burden on the eastern provinces. Most participants show strong support for allocating
emissions permits based on consumption-based emissions responsibilities.
1 Introduction
Reducing the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) linked to climate change is
a major challenge for international governance. China surpassed the United States in 2007 to
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become the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2) (IEA 2007; MNP 2007) and has
faced increasing international pressure to adopt stringent emissions-reduction commitments. In
international negotiations China has pledged to reduce its carbon intensity, i.e., CO2 emissions
per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 40–45% from 2005 levels by 2020 (NRDC 2009).
China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan for economic and social development (2011–2015) has
integrated part of its international commitment into binding national policy. It sets forth the aim
to reduce China's carbon intensity by 17 % from 2011 to 2015 and lays out plans to gradually
develop a carbon trading market. In 2011, the National Development and Reform Commission
of China initiated the development of seven regional carbon trading pilots in five cities
(Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Shenzhen) and two provinces (Guangdong, Hubei).
The pilots are expected to become operational in 2013 and inform the design of a national
emissions trading system to be announced in China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016–2020).
A national emissions trading system (ETS) has several well-studied advantages over a
regional allocation of emissions targets. First, an ETS attains economic efficiency by incen-
tivizing emissions reductions where they are cheapest. By contrast, regionally constrained
emissions limits reduce abatement flexibility, leading to equal or greater welfare losses (see,
e.g., Tietenberg 2006; and Zhang et al. 2013, for an application to the Chinese context).
Second, an ETS attains economic efficiency irrespective of the initial allocation of emissions
permits (Coase 1960; Montgomery 1972; Rose and Tietenberg 1993). Thus, efficiency and
distributional (equity) objectives can be addressed separately in an ETS.1
Distributional issues have been a major concern for China’s policy makers in recent years.
Pronounced differences exist between the developed eastern-coastal provinces and the less devel-
oped central and western provinces (Keidel 2007). Currently, the per-capita GDP in the inland
regions is less than half of that in the coastal regions on aggregate (Fan et al. 2011) and the
differences between individual provinces andmunicipalities can reach up to a factor of ten (National
Statistics Bureau of China 2008). To a large extent, preferential policy treatment of coastal regions
during China’s reform period in the late 1970s explains the existing regional economic differences
(Démurger et al. 2002). However, more recent regional development strategies have put increased
focus on reducing regional disparities (Chen and Zheng 2008)2 and the importance of promoting a
more balanced regional development has continued to feature prominently in the Eleventh and
Twelfth Five-Year Plans for economic and social development (2006–2010; 2011–2015).
In this study, we analyze the distributional aspects that are inherent in the design of a national
emissions trading system. We focus on the different design options for allocating emissions permits
to China’s provinces and the potential economic impacts that result. Although some ETS designs
foresee a complete auctioning of emissions permits,most schemes implemented to date have featured
an initial allocation of permits to ease the economic impacts on participating regions and industries
(Hood 2010). Opting for a specific allocation of emissions permits offers a means of balancing the
regional economic impacts of an ETS and at the same time addressing issues of equity and
distributional justice inherent in environmental policy making (Grubb et al. 1992; Kverndokk 1995).
This study takes a three-part approach to analyze the distributional aspects of a national
ETS in China. First, we construct a range of permit allocation schemes based on underlying
ethical frameworks. This part builds on earlier studies on the international burden-sharing of
1 The trade in emissions permits allows emissions to be reduced at least cost, while the initial allocation of
emissions permits determines the regional distribution of this cost burden.
2 Policies in that regard are e.g., the BWestern development strategy^ and the BRise of central China strategy^ in
the 1990s and 2000s.
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emissions reductions (see, e.g., Ringius et al. 2002; Kverndokk and Rose 2008), but adapts the
concepts discussed on the international level for the Chinese context.
Second, we analyze the potential economic impacts of different permit allocation schemes
by using an interregional energy-economic model of the Chinese economy that separately
represents the nation’s 30 provinces. This part builds on an earlier assessment of a future ETS
in China (Zhang et al. 2013) by explicitly considering different permit allocation schemes. By
simulating the regional economic impacts of different allocation schemes in a future ETS, we
also go beyond earlier studies which focused on the regional allocation of emissions-intensity
reductions among China’s provinces without considering their economic impacts or interac-
tions within an ETS (Wei et al. 2011; Yi et al. 2011).
Third, we juxtapose the simulation results with insights based on an ETS survey conducted
among Chinese research teams working on domestic climate policy analysis in China. The
survey is intended to scope the views on the interregional distribution of burden in a future ETS
in China and elicit the preferences for the specific permit allocation schemes analyzed in this
study. Our study contributes insights at the regional level, which carries unique importance in
China given the heterogeneity of its provinces, distinguishing it from previous studies focused
on burden-sharing across nations (Lange et al. 2007, 2010). The three parts of the analysis are
described below, followed by an integrated discussion of its implications.
2 Permit allocation and equity criteria
Equity considerations are implicit in any approach aimed at distributing the burden of climate
change (or the entitlements to emit). They indicate what a person perceives as fair or just (normative
perspective). They are also frequently used in international negotiations on climate change (positive
perspective), e.g., in the form of Bcommon but differentiated responsibilities^ laid out by the United
Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992, Art.3.1), or the polluter-pays principle
endorsed by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD 1989).
There exist various categorizations of equity principles. For example, Kverndokk and Rose
(2008) group equity principles into allocation-based, outcome-based, and process-based. This
study focusses on allocation-based and outcome-based approaches that inform the initial and
final allocation of emissions permits, respectively. Table 1 provides an overview of the equity
criteria selected for this study. Most of the criteria selected have become canonical (see
Kverndokk and Rose 2008, for a detailed review) – those include principles of sovereignty,
egalitarian, polluter pays, ability to pay, horizontal, and vertical.
We supplement the canonical equity criteria by three other criteria which are relevant for the
Chinese context. We consider two criteria based on emissions intensity, the environmental
reward and environmental subsidy criteria (see, e.g., Eyckmans and Finus 2004), due to
China’s focus on emissions intensity as a policy target. We also add a consumer-pays criterion
to account for the significant regional separation that exists within China between production
and consumption activities and their associated CO2 emissions (Meng et al. 2011; Guo et al.
2012; Feng et al. 2013; Springmann et al. 2015).
In real decision-making processes, multiple objectives may need to be taken into account,
something which would call for combining several equity principles into one allocation
scheme (see, e.g., Bear et al., 2008; Raupach et al. 2014). In the main text, we focus on
individual principles to illustrate their qualitative differences, but we explore some of the
potential combinations in a dedicated sensitivity analysis.
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In the following, we will focus on specific allocation schemes emerging from the different
equity principles. In order to use an equity principle to allocate emissions permits, one has to
specify its reference base. A reference base, such as emissions or population, transforms an equity
principle into an operational rule, but has no ethical content by itself (Rose et al. 1998). The
reference bases applied to the equity criteria selected in this study are emissions (territorial and
consumption-based), GDP, emissions intensity (i.e., emissions per unit of GDP), and population.
2.1 Database
For specifying the equity criteria, reference bases, and the associated allocation schemes for the
Chinese context, we employ a comprehensive database of economic activity, energy use, and
associated CO2 emissions for China’s provinces compiled by Zhang et al. (2013). The data is
based on China’s national input-output table and the full set of China’s provincial input-output
tables published in 2007 (National Statistics Bureau of China 2011). The provincial input-output
data for China specifies benchmark economic accounts for 30 provinces in China (Tibet is not
Table 1 Overview of various equity criteria, their definition, potential references bases, and the operational rules
that follow. Scenario abbreviations are listed for further reference in the model and results sections. For detailed
discussions on the equity criteria, see e.g., Rose et al. (1998), Kverndokk and Rose (2008), Ringius et al. (2002),
and Eyckmans and Finus (2006)
Criterion Basic definition Reference base Operational rule Scenario
Allocation-Based
Sovereignty All regions have an equal right to
pollute and to be protected from
pollution.
territorial
emissions
Distribute permits
in proportion
to emissions.
SOV
Polluter pays The producers of goods should be
held responsible for the pollution
generated in the process.
territorial
emissions
Distribute permits
inversely to
emissions.
PPP
Consumer pays The consumer of goods should be
held responsible for the pollution
generated in the process.
consumption-based
emissions
Distribute permits
inversely to
emissions.
CPP
Egalitarian All people have an equal right
to pollute and to be protected
from pollution.
population Distribute permits in
proportion to
population.
EGA
Ability to pay Greater burden should be
shouldered by those with
higher economic resources.
inverse GDP Distribute permits
inversely to
per-capita GDP.
ABT
Environmental
reward
Greater burden should be
shouldered by those with higher
potential for reducing emissions.
inverse emissions
intensity
Distribute permits
inversely to
emissions intensity.
ERE
Environmental
subsidy
The regions with the greatest
potential for reducing emissions
should be supported.
emissions intensity Distribute permits
in proportion to
emissions intensity.
ESU
Outcome-Based
Horizontal Regions with similar economic
circumstances should bear
similar burden.
welfare Equalize welfare
changes across
regions.
EQU
Vertical Regions with higher per-capita
GDP should bear a greater
burden.
welfare Distribute net welfare
losses in proportion
to per-capita GDP.
PRG
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included due to a lack of data and the small scale of its economic activities). Energy use is based
on the 2007 China Energy Statistical Yearbook and emissions totals are quantified using fuel-
specific CO2 emissions factors (National Statistics Bureau of China 2008). Zhang et al. (2013)
provide further details on the method used for balancing and combining the data sets.
For ease of presentation, we group China’s provinces into eastern, central, and western ones
according to the three economic zones defined in China’s Seventh Five-Year Plan (State Council
of China 1986; Feng et al. 2012).3 Supplementary Figure S1 provides the details of this regional
aggregation.4 The eastern provinces belong to the most economically developed areas with high
levels of industrialization and rapid growth in international trade. The central provinces are less
developed than the eastern provinces, but they have well-established infrastructures and abundant
natural resources, such as coal, oil, and metal ores. The western provinces are the least developed
ones, but they possess abundant coal, oil and natural gas reserves.
Figure 1 shows the regional distribution of the indicators used as references bases for this
study’s allocation schemes (CO2 emissions, GDP, emissions intensity, and population). In general,
population, economic activity, and CO2 emissions are most concentrated in the eastern provinces,
less concentrated in the central provinces, and least concentrated in the western provinces.
Consumption-based emissions exacerbate that trend, because the eastern provinces consume
more goods and associated CO2 emissions than they produce (see Supplementary Figure S2). The
distribution of emissions intensity shows an opposite trend, i.e., lower emissions intensity in the
eastern provinces and higher emissions intensity in the central and western provinces, which
reflects differences in technological progress and industrial composition.
2.2 Permit allocation across China’s provinces
We follow Rose et al. (1998) in their general methodology of mathematically specifying
different permit-allocation schemes. To obtain the allocation of emissions permits for region r
and allocation scenario i (Er
i), we distribute a national emissions target CO2
 
among Chinese
provinces in proportion to their share with respect to the chosen reference base (br
i):
Eir ¼
birX
s
bis
CO2 ð1Þ
For example, the egalitarian scenario allocates emissions permits in proportion to a region’s
population divided by the total population and multiplied by the national emissions target. To
specify the consumer-pays criterion, we calculate consumption-based emissions using a multi-
regional input-output approach that accounts for the emissions embodied in China’s interre-
gional trade (see Springmann et al. 2015).5
3 Following Feng et al. (2012), we group Guangxi as a western province due to its economic similarities with
western provinces. Although Inner Mongolia is sometimes also grouped as a western province, we group it as a
central province, which is in line with its economic characteristics and with the grouping described by the State
Council of China (1986).
4 All supplementary material are contained in an online resource, which is made available on the journal’s
website.
5 The outcome-based allocation scenarios (vertical and horizontal) depart from this methodology because they
impose constraints on the outcome of economic model simulations. The horizontal EQU scenario equalizes the
proportional welfare impacts across all provinces and the vertical PRG scenario distributes welfare losses in
proportion to per-capita GDP. The details of the economic model and the model simulations are described in
Section 3.
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The basis for each allocation scenario is a stylized national emissions trading system in
which the national emissions cap is set 17.7 % below benchmark emissions. As of writing,
there is little information about how much a national ETS would contribute to China’s overall
emissions intensity target and how stringent the absolute emissions trajectory of a future ETS
would be. In absence of such information, we have chosen to adopt an absolute emissions
target that, in our static energy-economic model, results in similar emissions intensity reduc-
tions as aimed for in China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015). Absolute emissions targets
can be expected to differ in a dynamic setting that takes into account projections of economic
growth, but their exact value is less relevant for the focus of our study, which is to analyze the
distributional impacts of different permit allocation schemes. We test this assertion by
conducting a sensitivity analysis with higher and lower emissions targets.
Finally, we constrain the permit allocation such that no province can be allocated more than
its baseline emissions. The purpose of this Bstand-alone rule^ (Lange et al. 2007) is to avoid
undermining emissions-reduction efforts in overallocated provinces, which may be viewed as
unacceptable by constrained provinces. Supplementary Section S3 shows that overallocation
would also lead to disproportional wealth transfers (in terms of permit revenues).
Figure 2 displays the regional allocation of emissions permits for the allocation scenarios
considered (Supplementary Table S4 lists the permit allocation for each province). Several scenarios
exhibit similar allocative characteristics (after each provinces’ permit allocation has been constrained
to not exceed its benchmark emissions). The ERE and SOV scenarios allocate most emissions
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 1 Regional distribution of a CO2 emission (100 million tons), b GDP (billion Yuan), c CO2 emission
intensity (ton/10,000 Yuan), and d population (million) across China’s provinces in 2007. Tibet is not included
due to data availability
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permits to the eastern provinces because their allocation methods reward low emissions intensity
(ERE) and high emissions (SOV). The central provinces are allocated about a third less emissions
permits than the eastern provinces, and the western provinces about half. In line with the allocation
method of the SOV scenario, each province is allocated the same proportional 17.7 % reduction of
emissions permits compared to current benchmark emissions.
Going from the EGA scenario to the ABTscenario, fewer emissions permits are allocated to the
eastern provinces andmore to the central and western ones. The shift in permit allocation is small in
the EGA scenario as the eastern provinces have a greater population on aggregate than the central
andwestern ones. However, the proportional cutback between benchmark emissions and emissions-
permit allocation for the eastern provinces increases to 33–35 % in the PRG, PPP, ESU, CPP, and
ABT scenarios. This is in line with the scenarios’ allocation methods, which allot more emissions
permits to the provinces with low emissions (PPP), high emissions intensities (ESU), low con-
sumption (CPP), and low per-capita GDP (ABT, PRG), all of which are concentrated more in the
center and west than in the east. As a result of the stand-alone rule, the PPP, ESU, CPP, and ABT
scenarios allocate permits in proportion to benchmark emissions to many western provinces, while
permit allocations in the PRG scenario approach benchmark levels in some central provinces.
3 Economic impacts of different permit allocations
We now turn to simulate the economic and distributional effects of allocating emissions
permits in a Chinese ETS according to the scenarios described above. For this analysis, we
use an energy-economic model with regional detail for the Chinese economy (see Zhang et al.
2013). We provide a short model description followed by a discussion of the results.
3.1 Energy-economic model
The energy-economic model is a static multi-regional multi-sector computable general equi-
librium model based on optimizing behavior of economic agents. Consumers maximize
Fig. 2 Regional permit allocation to China’s eastern, central, and western provinces for the different allocation
scenarios described in Table 1. The dashed horizontal lines indicate the aggregated benchmark emissions for the
eastern, central, and western provinces
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welfare subject to budget constraints and producers combine intermediate inputs and primary
factors at least cost to produce output. Energy resources are included as primary factors and
their use is associated with the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2). The production of energy
and other goods is described by nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production
functions which specify the input composition and substitution possibilities among inputs.
Inputs into production include labor, capital, natural resources, and intermediate inputs.
Supplementary Section S5 contains further details on the model’s nesting structure and its
formulation.
The model is calibrated to a comprehensive energy-economic data set which includes a
consistent representation of energy markets in physical units, as well as detailed economic
accounts for the year 2007. The dataset is global, but includes regional detail for China's
provinces. The global data comes from the database version 8 of the Global Trade Analysis
Project (GTAP, Narayanan et al. 2012). Results for the rest of the world are aggregated at the
level of three international regions (Europe, USA, and the rest of the world) to capture the
international market impacts of distributional changes within China. The data for China is
based on the country’s national input-output table and the full set of provincial input-output
tables published in 2007 (National Information Center of China, 2011) as described in
Section 2. We resolve six energy sectors and 10 non-energy composites.6 Elasticities of
substitution are adopted from the GTAP 8 database, as well as from the MIT Emissions
Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al. 2005).
Although we calibrate our energy-economic model to the latest available data, we note that
the model results are best be seen as illustrative of the general trends and relative trade-offs
between the ETS allocation scenarios. In line with our distributional focus, we abstract from
dynamic aspects that describe future trajectories of emissions and economic development
which would be important for concrete forecasts of China’s future climate policies. In contrast,
the relative changes across the different allocation scenarios can be seen as sufficiently robust
under a wide range of potential ETS designs (see the sensitivity analysis contained in
Supplementary Section S9 and Zhang et al. 2013, who analyze the effects of market distortions
and parameter assumptions using the same energy-economic model applied here).
3.2 Permit transfers and welfare impacts
In an ETS, the trade in emissions permits results in the equalization of marginal abatement
costs across provinces leading to a cost-efficient distribution of emissions reductions and a
single price of carbon, which, in the scenarios analyzed here, amounts to 15 USD/tCO2. Of
interest under each scenario is the final distribution of emissions reductions, the transfer of
permits supporting this distribution, as well as the resulting changes in welfare levels for the
different ETS allocation scenarios considered.
All national ETS scenarios result in a common cost-effective distribution of emissions
reductions. Although the absolute emissions reductions are similar for the eastern, central, and
western provinces (about 330 MtCO2 on average), the western provinces reduce emissions the
most on a percentage basis – by 27 % on aggregate – followed by the central and eastern
6 The energy goods include coal (COL), crude oil (CRU), refined-oil and coal products (OIL), natural gas (GAS),
gas manufacture and distribution (GDT), and electricity (ELE); the non-energy sectors include agriculture
(AGR), minerals mining (OMN), light industries (LID), energy-intensive industries (EID), transport equipment
(TME), other manufacturing industries (OID), water (WTR), trade (TRD), transport (TRP), other service industry
(OTH).
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provinces which reduce their emissions by 20 and 12 %, respectively (see Supplementary
Table S6). Underlying this cost-effective distribution of emissions reductions are regional
differences in marginal abatement costs, which are highest in the eastern provinces and lowest
in the western ones – the distribution of emissions intensities is indicative of those differences
(see Fig. 1).
The distribution of emissions reductions can differ significantly from the initial distribution
of emissions permits in each scenario. The differences are especially pronounced in the PPP,
ESU, CPP, and ABT scenarios in which most of the western provinces are allocated their
benchmark emissions and the eastern provinces are allocated 35 % fewer permits than their
benchmark emissions on aggregate.
Supplementary Section S7 details the permit (and associated financial) transfers that occur
to achieve the distribution of emissions reductions in each ETS scenario. The permit transfers
emerge as the difference between the cost-efficient distribution of emissions reductions and the
emissions permits allocated in each scenario. In each scenario, the eastern provinces are, on
aggregate, net buyers of emissions permits, while the central and western provinces are net
sellers. The permit and revenue transfers increase from about 130–160 MtCO2 for USD 1.9–
2.3 billion in the ERE and SOV scenarios to 560–660 MtCO2 for USD 8.3–9.8 billion in the
PRG, PPP, ESU, CPP, and ABT scenarios, which is in line with the reduction in the amount of
emissions permits allocated to the eastern provinces in those scenarios.
Figure 3 shows the regional welfare impacts in terms of equivalent variation of income for
the different ETS allocation scenarios (provincial-level welfare impacts are listed in
Supplementary Table S8). Each ETS scenario results in a cost-efficient distribution of emis-
sions reductions with the same national welfare impact. However, regional welfare impacts
differ according to each province’s permit allocation, marginal abatement costs, and transfer of
permit revenues. As a consequence, the ERE, SOV, and EGA scenarios exhibit low welfare
losses for the eastern provinces, but high losses for the central ones (as those are particularly
reliant on fossil-fuel production), while the PRG, PPP, ESU, CPP, and ABT scenarios show
Fig. 3 Regional distribution of welfare impacts in terms of equivalent variation of income (EV) for the different
allocation scenario. The ERE and SOV scenarios and the PPP, ESU, CPP, ABT are associated with similar
welfare impacts; we group those scenarios together (by taking the average values) for ease of presentation. The
figure serves as basis for the survey described in section 4
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low welfare losses or even gains for the western provinces, but greater losses for the eastern
ones. By definition, the EQU scenario yields a proportionally equal burden for all provinces.
We conducted two sensitivity analysis to complement the main results. A sensitivity
analysis contained in Supplementary Section S9 shows that the relative trade-offs between
allocation schemes are robust with respect to changes in the stringency of the overall emissions
target and to changes in key model parameters that govern the substitutability of energy inputs
with other goods and of goods between provinces. A sensitivity analysis contained in
Supplementary Section S10 shows that adopting two mixed allocation schemes (PPP+ABT,
SOV+EGA) that have been discussed in the literature (Baer et al. 2008; Raupach et al. 2014)
results in similar permit allocation and welfare impacts as the individual allocation schemes,
something that is largely due to the Bstand-alone rule,^ which rules out overallocation and
leads to convergence among the individual allocation schemes.
4 Choosing among allocation schemes
The preceding analysis provided an overview of the distribution of economic impacts under a
wide range of allocation schemes applied to the Chinese context. Each allocation scheme is
supported by a specific equity criterion and therefore justifiable from a particular ethical
position. This complicates the selection and recommendation of a particular allocation rule
to policymakers. Instead of assuming what equity rule would be most compelling in China, we
conducted a survey to scope the views on the different allocation schemes and, more generally,
on the importance of the interregional distribution of burden in a future ETS in China.
4.1 Survey overview
The survey was distributed among Chinese research groups involved in the analysis and
design of climate policy in China. In general, input from expert research groups is very
important in China’s policy process (Cao 2004). In the process of establishing pilot emissions
trading schemes as part of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the government is regularly seeking
input from research groups on the design of a future emissions trading system, and the policy
advice provided to the government has, in many instances, been based on model assessments.
We therefore focus on research groups with modeling capacity in national climate policies as
target group for our survey.
The survey was distributed at two instances which ensured the representation of relevant
research teams in our focus group (see Supplementary Section S12). We received 44 responses
which constitutes a good response rate given the target group. While we cannot claim that our
sample is representative of specific population groups (see Supplementary Table S12.2), it can
provide insights into the relative merits of alternative burden-sharing scenarios according to
scholars involved in China’s climate policy design.
The questionnaire administered in the survey was structured into four parts (see
Supplementary Information 2). The first elicited the participants’ general views on the
importance of distributional issues (equity) and of efficiency. The second part asked the
participants to distribute the burden of emissions reduction among China’s regions (eastern,
central, western) and express their opinion on different burden-sharing rules. The third part
presented participants with the model outcomes discussed in the last section (Fig. 5) and asked
for their preferred outcome and unacceptable outcomes. The welfare impacts were first
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presented without scenario labels and then with scenario labels and brief descriptions of the
equity criteria supporting each allocation scenario. The intention behind this two-stage ap-
proach was to elicit participants’ distributional preferences with and without the ethical
framing. The participants were given the option to change their preferences based on the
information provided. Finally, the questionnaire asked for some background information, such
as age, affiliation, and regions of origin and residence.
4.2 Survey results
Over 80 % of the respondents declare that they are concerned with the way the economic
burden of greenhouse gas reduction is distributed among China’s provinces and more than half
think that fairly distributing the burden of emissions reduction has the same importance as
reducing emissions at least cost (see Supplementary Table S13). When prompted to distribute
the burden of emissions reduction among China’s regions, assuming that the distribution of
burden does not increase overall costs, most respondents would put a medium-high to high
burden on the eastern provinces (89 %), a medium burden on the central provinces (66 %), and
a low to medium-low burden on the western provinces (75 %). The associated distribution of
frequencies is shown in Fig. 4.
Figure 5 details the respondents’ preferences for specific allocation schemes. When pre-
sented with the simulated welfare impacts of the specific unlabeled burden-sharing criteria
considered in this study, 41 % chose the progressive (PRG) scenario as their most preferred
one, followed by the aggregate of polluter pays, consumer pays, ability to pay, and environ-
mental subsidy (PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU) which was chosen by 27 %; the egalitarian (EGA)
scenario was chosen by the least (7 %). When asked which of the different outcomes would be
unacceptable (multiple choices were possible here), 57 % of the respondents indicated that
they would not be willing to accept the sovereignty and environmental reward (SOV/ERE)
scenarios, 34 % would not accept the equal impact (EQU) scenario, and 30 % would not
accept the egalitarian (EGA) scenario.
Fig. 4 Respondents’ preferences for the regional distribution of emissions-reduction burden among the eastern,
central, and western provinces
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When the burden-sharing scenarios were identified, a third of the respondents (32 %)
changed their preference, mostly from the PRG scenario to the PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU one.
While most respondents did not provide a reason for that change, the ones that did noted that
the aggregate PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU scenario is more comprehensive and that it considers both
responsibility and capacity. The final distribution of preferences (depicted in the lower panel of
Fig. 5) shows that 43 % would prefer the PPP/CPP/ABT/ESU scenario, 30 % the PRG
scenario, 11 % the EQU scenario, 9 % the SOV/ERE scenario, and 7 % the EGA scenario.
When asked about their agreement on the individual burden-sharing criteria in the PPP/
CPP/ABT/ESU group, the respondents indicated strongest agreement with the CPP criterion,
followed by the PPP, ESU, and ABT scenarios (see Supplementary Figure S13).
4.3 Discussion of survey results
Interestingly, we find that most respondents favor a higher burden on the east and lower burden
on the center and west, as well as a preference for allocation schemes which are supported by
multiple criteria. A stratification of responses by regions of origin and residence shows that
respondents are not markedly influenced by their former or current locations (Supplementary
Section S14). This is opposed to findings from surveys on burden-sharing on the international
level (Lange et al. 2007, 2010). One reason for the difference may be that environmental
(including climate) policy issues are traditionally addressed at the central level in China (Wang
2013; Kostka 2015), and balancing impacts across regions is often an important consideration
Fig. 5 Respondents’ preference for the specific allocation schemes considered in this study. The initial
preferences followed the presentation of unlabeled welfare outcomes, the final preferences the presentation of
labeled outcomes and scenario descriptions, and the unacceptable criteria indicate the schemes the respondents
found unacceptable when first presented (with multiple choices possible)
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(Wei et al., 2011; Yi et al. 2011). Thus, the experts in our target group may adopt a regionally
more balanced view on distributional and efficiency issues than lay persons or representatives
from affected industries and policy experts from other countries.
The ideologies of collectivism and centralism have a long tradition in China and offer a
potential explanation for the stated differences in views. Rooted in Chinese philosophy, collec-
tivism and centralism are components of themoral education by the Communist Party (Law 2006;
Lee and Ho 2006), and as a result, affect both politics (Lai 2002) and daily business (Chen et al.
1997). Concrete representations of collectivism are the concepts of Bbalancing regional
development^ and Brich people help the poor^, which have been adopted by policy makers since
the 1990s as a means of addressing China’s regional imbalances. Given the increasingly prom-
inent role of the central government in environmental policy decisions, previous scholars have
noted how environmental NGOs and civil society in China tend to stay more in line with the
directions from the central government compared to their western counterparts (Ho 2001).^
Notwithstanding, there are several caveats to bear in mind when interpreting the survey results.
First, we cannot rule out occasional misinterpretations of survey questions and an impact from
framing the questions.7 We tried to address this point by providing explanatory paragraphs,
bilingual questionnaires, and possibilities for personal feedback. Second, our target group consisted
of climate-policy experts and therefore does not represent broader views on desirable distributional
outcomes in China. Finally, the survey’s regional aggregation into three broad regions may hide
some regional differences and the respondents’ interests in the impacts for specific provinces.
5 Conclusion
China has embarked on an ambitious pathway for establishing a national carbon market in the
next 5–10 years. In this study, we have analyzed the distributional aspects of a Chinese ETS
from ethical, economic, and stated-preference perspectives. We have focused on the role of
emissions permit allocation and showed that a wide range of potential allocation schemes exist,
each supported by a specific equity principle. The economic analysis has shown that several
allocation schemes exhibit similar distributional characteristics in terms of regional welfare
impacts and flows of emissions permits when overallocation is ruled out.
A surveywe have conducted among climate-policy researchers in China has indicated a relative
preference for those allocation schemes that put less emissions-reduction burden on the western
provinces, a medium burden on the central provinces, and a high burden on the eastern provinces.
When presented with the specific allocation schemes considered in this study, most respondents
preferred the welfare outcome associated with the equity criteria of polluter pays, consumer pays,
ability to pay, and ecological subsidy, noting that this combination of criteria is most comprehen-
sive, while at the same time being in line with the respondents’ general distributional preferences.
From a fiscal perspective, each allocation scheme would imply significant interregional
transfers. In each allocation scheme, the eastern provinces are found to be net buyers of
emissions permits, with permit payments to the western and central provinces ranging between
USD 2–10 billion depending on the allocation scheme. In comparison, the annual equalization
transfer, which was established by the Chinese government in 1995 to ease the widening
7 In particular the EQU (equal welfare losses imposed across all provinces) may not have been well understood
by survey respondents, given that it is based on a theoretical construct and not on a tangible indicator or
indicators, which have been used to guide the setting of China’s energy and climate policy to date.
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regional disparities, amounted to about USD 9 billion (74.5 billion Yuan) in 2004 (Shen et al.,
2012). The financial transfers associated with an ETS would therefore constitute a significant
flow of interregional funds.8
From a political perspective, adopting allocation schemes which generate large interregion-
al transfers could be challenging. An analysis of the regional emissions-intensity targets of the
China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan has shown that the eastern provinces currently shoulder a
relatively modest reduction burden compared to that of the central and western provinces (see
Supplementary Section S11 and Springmann et al. 2015). The potentially negative conse-
quences for the eastern provinces in those scenarios that are preferred by most survey
participants may hinder adoption given the political and economic influence that those
provinces have. However, there may exist room for negotiation between the central govern-
ment and the provinces on specific allocation schemes, as moving from regional targets to an
ETS could significantly reduce overall (national) welfare losses (Zhang et al. 2013).
Although our analysis has focused on the Chinese context, its approach of studying the
distributional impacts of regional emissions allocation within a national emissions-trading system
has international implications. Balancing economic efficiency with distributional and equity con-
cerns can be expected to play a key role in other emerging carbon markets, in particular in countries
with large regional inequalities and uneven economic development, such Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Mexico, Turkey, and the USA. While some analyses exist for a selection of those countries (Rose
and Zhang 2004; Böhringer et al. 2014), none have elicited the potential preferences that affected
groups might have for particular burden sharing schemes, and few have considered an extended set
of equity criteria that includes consumption-based responsibilities despite the large fraction of
emissions embodied in goods traded within those countries (Caron et al. 2014). By combining
economic modeling of a large set of equity criteria with survey techniques, our study represents a
more comprehensive analysis than those relying on one method alone. Such multi-method ap-
proachesmay prove compelling as away to identify consensus options in the policy design process –
both in China and in other regions with high degrees of uneven economic development.
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